



Canonical ID: 88BAGHDAD855_a
Subject: VIEWS OF IRANIAN KURDISH LEADER QASSEMLU
From: Iraq Baghdad
To: Defense Intelligence Agency, GULF WAR COLLECTIVE, Secretary of State, Sweden Stockholm, USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: -- Not Assigned --
Archive Status: -- Not Assigned --
Type: TE
Locator: TEXT ONLINE
Reference(s): -- N/A or Blank --
Executive Order (E.O.): -- Not Assigned --
Markings: -- Not Assigned --
Enclosure: -- Not Assigned --
Concepts: -- Not Assigned --
TAGS: Iran [IR]
Iraq [IZ]
Military and Defense Affairs--Military Operations [MOPS]
Political Affairs--Government; Internal Governmental Affairs [PGOV]
Political Affairs--Human Rights [PHUM]
Political Affairs--Intelligence [PINR]
Political Affairs--Terrorists and Terrorism [PTER]
Office: -- N/A or Blank --
Document Character Count: 19742
Date: 1988 February 16, 11:24 (Tuesday)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 00855

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARAGRAPH 3, LAST THREE SENTENCES)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, MOPS, PHUM, PTER, PINR, IZ, IR
SUBJECT: VIEWS OF IRANIAN KURDISH LEADER QASSEMLU

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: COMING DOWN OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS FOR ONE OF HIS OCCASIONAL TRIPS TO BAGHDAD, IRANIAN KURDISH LEADER QASSEMLU MET SADDAM FEBRUARY 10. QASSEMLU ADMITTED THAT INTENSE SHELLING IN THE AREA OF HIS FORMER HEADQUARTERS (DOWNRIVER FROM THE EMBATTLED TOWN OF MAWAT) HAD FORCED HIM RECENTLY TO MOVE 35 KILOMETERS NORTH. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE 10-12,000 ACTIVE FIGHTERS AND THE CAPABILITY TO CALL ON MANY MORE AND TO HAVE AMPLE ARMS (CAPTURED FROM IRANIANS) AND MONEY (THROUGH SMUGGLING). HE MADE AN APPEAL FOR U.S. "MORAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT," NOTING THAT HIS PARTY HAS ALWAYS STRONGLY DISAPPROVED OF HOSTAGE-TAKING. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR HAS APPROACHED HIM ON BEHALF OF KIDNAPPEES HELD BY TALABANI AND HE IS HOPEFUL THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO GET THEM FREED.

3. QASSEMLU DESCRIBED HIS RELATIONS WITH TALABANI AS



GOOD, ALTHOUGH HIS POLICY OF STRICT NEUTRALITY BETWEEN TALABANI AND THE IRAQIS SOMETIMES CAUSES FRICTION. QASSEMLU RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR AN ALLIANCE WITH OTHER IRANIAN OPPOSITION GROUPS, BUT RAJAVI--WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS AN "AMATEUR"--SEEMS UNWILLING. RAJAVI'S LIMITED MILITARY ACTIONS IN THE NORTH COMPLICATED QASSEMLU'S RELATIONS WITH TALABANI, AND RAJAVI WILL NOW MOVE HIS EFFORTS SOUTH. UNLIKE RAJAVI, QASSEMLU AVOIDS EVER BEING PHOTOGRAPHED WITH SADDAM. QASSEMLU DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN AS STABLE, WHILE THE SITUATION IN IRAQI KURDISTAN HAS "SHARPLY DETERIORATED" (I.E., FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY IN BAGHDAD) DURING THE PAST THREE YEARS. THE IRAQI VILLAGE DESTRUCTION CAMPAIGN HAS NOT YET BEEN MIRRORED ON A LARGE SCALE IN IRAN. END SUMMARY

4. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE 1988 CONGRESS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN OF IRAN (KDPI), SECRETARY GENERAL A.R. QASSEMLU (WHO SPELLS HIS NAME GHASSEMLU) CAME DOWN FROM THE MOUNTAINS TO MEET SADDAM HUSSEIN FEBRUARY 10. BECAUSE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF IRANIAN KURDS IN SWEDEN AND FRANCE, QASSEMLU TYPICALLY CONTACTS THE SWEDISH AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS WHEN HE MAKES TRIPS TO BAGHDAD, EVERY FIVE TO SEVEN MONTHS. POLCHIEF LOBBIED SWEDISH AMBASSADOR THOREN FOR A MEETING WITH QASSEMLU AND WAS INVITED TO A SIX-HOUR LUNCH FEBRUARY 12. QASSEMLU CAME ACROSS AS EXTREMELY OPEN, SOPHISTICATED, AND ARTICULATE, EVEN IN ENGLISH WHICH IS ONLY HIS SIXTH-BEST LANGUAGE (AFTER KURDISH, PERSIAN, ARABIC, FRENCH, AND CZECH). HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE DIRECTORS OF THE KDPI'S PARIS, STOCKHOLM, AND BAGHDAD OFFICES (ABDULLAH GHEDERI, EBRAHIM DJEURABESKA, AND SALAM AZIZI).

APPEAL FOR MORAL SUPPORT

5. QASSEMLU MADE A STRONG APPEAL FOR AMERICAN "MORAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT." HE OBSERVED THAT THE KDPI HAS ALWAYS HAD A POLICY OF STRONGLY OBJECTING TO TERRORISM AND HOSTAGE-TAKING, AND HE PROVIDED POLCHIEF WITH A PAPER HE HAD RECENTLY PRESENTED (THROUGH HIS REPRESENTATIVE) AT A PARIS SYMPOSIUM ON TERRORISM, IN WHICH HE OBJECTED TO TERRORISM AS A TOOL FOR REVOLUTIONARY LIBERATION GROUPS. HE CLAIMED TO BE PERPLEXED THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS RECEIVED "A RAGTAG BUNCH OF BACKWARD AFGHAN FUNDAMENTALISTS" AND PERSISTS IN TRYING TO BOLSTER "NONVIABLE NICARAGUAN GROUPS," WHILE NOT AFFORDING ATTENTION TO "TRUE DEMOCRATIC GROUPS" WHO ARE FIGHTING FOR "UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS."

6. POLCHIEF OBSERVED THAT THERE IS PUBLIC SYMPATHY FOR THE KURDISH SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES BUT NOT VERY MUCH IS KNOWN ABOUT IT; QASSEMLU MIGHT DO WELL TO



CULTIVATE JOURNALISTS. QASSEMLU SAID THAT ONE OF THE THINGS HE HAD DONW WHILE IN BAGHDAD THIS TIME WAS TO PUSH THROUGH A VISA FOR THE WASHINGTON POSO'S JONATHAN RANDAL (PARIS), WHO HE SAID IS WRITING A BOOK ABOUT KURDS AND TO WHOM HE HAS GIVEN FOURTEEN HOURS OF INTERVIEW. QASSEMLU LAMENTED THAT "THE SOVIETS ALWAYS TEND TO SEE THE KDPI AS SUPPORTED BY THE AMERICANS AND THE AMERICANS ALWAYS SUSPECT THE SOVIETS" WHILE IN FACT THE KDPI HAS NO FRIENDS. "OUR ONLY FRIENDS ARE THE MOUNTAINS."

ITALIAN HOSTAGES

7. QASSEMLU ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAD JUST MET ITALIAN AMBASSADOR TOSCANO AND GIVEN HIM A PLEDGE TO DO WHAT HE COULD ABOUT THE THREE ITALIAN KIDNAPPEES BEING HELD BY TALABANI'S PATRIOTIC UNION OF KURDISTAN (PUK). HE NOTED THAT HE HAD INTERVENED OCCASIONALLY IN THE PAST, HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN INFLUENCING TALABANI TO RELEASE HOSTAGES, AND HE "HAD EVERY CONFIDENCE" THAT HE WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL AGAIN. (HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE ITALIANS HAD APPROACHED HIM AND THUS HE HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY MADE ANY EFFORTS ON THE CIVILIAN'S BEHALF.) QASSEMLU BETRAYED A TRACE OF ANNOYANCE THAT OTHER GROUPS' WILLINGNESS TO RESORT TO TERRORISM HAD GAINED THEM GREATER ATTENTION THAN THAT GIVEN THE KDPI, EVEN THOUGH THE KDPI, HE CLAIMED, IS A "MUCH MORE FIRMLY AND WIDELY BASED ORGANIZATION."

KDPI BASE OF SUPPORT

8. QASSEMLU SAID THAT HE HAS 10-12,000 ACTIVE FIGHTERS AND "CANNOT HANDLE" ANY MORE THAN THAT FOR LOGISTICAL JEXNSJM WHENEVER HE NEEDS, HE CAN CALL UP "SEVERAL MULTIPLES" OF THAT FIGURE. HE CLAIMED THAT HE HAS NO REAL COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE AMONG IRANIAN KURDS ("80 PERCENT ARE BEHIND ME") AND HE SCOFFED AT THE SITUATION IN IRAQ: "THERE IS NOTHING SIMILAR IN IRAN TO A (KURDISH) TAHA MA'RUF AS 'VICE PRESIDENT' OR THE KURDS THAT HOLD MINISTRIES HERE. THERE IS NOTHING LIKE THE HUGE NUMBERS OF 'JAHASH'" (THE PEJORATIVE TERM FOR THE KURDISH TRIBAL FORCES HELD BY VHENIRAIE (##) --AND THUS BECOME SOMETHING EQUIVALENT TO THE "JAHASH.").

9. IN HIS APPEAL FOR AMERICAN "MORAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT," QASSEMLU STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT CALLING FOR MONEY OR ARMS. "OF COURSE ONE ALWAYS LIKES MORE, BUT WE HAVE PLENTY." HE CLAIMED THAT THE KDPI HAS, OVER THE YEARS, BEEN ABLE TO CAPTURE AMPLE ARMS FROM THE IRANIAN URMYPASDARAN. HE WAS RELUCTANT TO GO INTO



HIS FINANCIAL SOURCES, CLAIMING ONLY THAT "EVERY FAMILY IN KURDISTAN MAKES VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS," BUT IN THE COURSE OF CONVERSATION IT BECAME CLEAR THAT BOTH THE KDPI AND PUK SUSTAIN THEMSELVES IN LARGE PART THROUGH SMUGGLING. QASSEMLU SAID THAT HE "ONLY" CHARGES A "THREE PERCENT DUTY" ON GOODS PASSING FROM IRAQ INTO IRAN, AS OPPOSED TO "AS MUCH AS TWENTY PERCENT" LEVIED BY TALABANI. EXAMPLES OF GOODS GOING INTO IRAN INCLUDE WHISKEY AND VIDEOS AND OF GOODS GOING INTO IRAQ, CARPETS AND PISTACHIOS. FORMERLY TEA CAME FROM IRAQ AND SUGAR FROM IRAN, BUT LATELY BOTH TEA AND SUGAR HAVE BEEN MOVING FROM IRAQ INTO IRAN. QASSEMLU SAID THAT HE HAD RECENTLY ASKED TALABANI HOW LONG HE COULD SURVIVE FINANCIALLY IF HIS MONETARY SOURCES SUDDENLY DRIED UP, AND TALABANI SAID, "TWO MONTHS," WHEREAS QASSEMLU CLAIMED HE WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY GOING ON FOR "AT LEAST TWO YEARS."

10. QASSEMLU DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN AS "STABLE," I.E., MUCH THE SAME AS IT HAS BEEN SINCE 1980 WHEN THE KDPI LOST ITS CONTROL OVER THE CITIES AND CHANGED FROM CONVENTIONAL WARFARE TO GUERRILLA TACTICS. THE IRANIANS CONTROL THE CITIES NOW BUT ONLY CONTROL THE MAIN HIGHWAYS FROM EIGHT TO FIVE; THE KDPI TAKES OVER AT NIGHT. QASSEMLU PROXESSED TO BE "OPTIMISTIC" ABOUT THE FUTURE, SINCE HIS SUPPORT IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN IS "ROCK-SOLID." HE SAID THAT HE IS PREPARED TO HOLD OUT IN THE MOUNTAINS FOR 25 YEARS, BUT IF KHOMEINI DIES SOON "THERE MAY BE CONSIDERABLE TURMOIL IN TEHRAN," AND THE IRANIAN ECONOMY IS "IN A TAILSPIN." WHEN ASKED WHETHER HE OR TALABANI AND BARZANI CONTROLLED MORE TERRAIN, QASSEMLU SAID THAT THREE YEARS AGO HE DID, BUT NOW THE IRAQI KURDS DO. THE REASON, HE EXPLAINED, IS NOT THAT HE IS DOING WORSE--TO THE CONTRARY HE IS HOLDING HIS OWN--IT IS RATHER THAT THE SITUATION FOR THE BAGHDAD REGIME IN IRAQI KURDISTAN HAS "DETERIORATED SO SHARPLY" OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS. (#) CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN BRINGING TALABANI AND SADDAM TOGETHER FOR PROLONGED NEGOTIATIONS TH YEARS AGO, WHICH BROKE DOWN.

COMPELLED TO MOVE HEADQUARTERS

11. QASSEMLU ADMITTED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY BEEN OBLIGED TO MOVE HIS HEADQUARTERS BECAUSE OF INTENSE IRANIAN SHELLING. HIS FORMER HEADQUARTERS--HE POINTED OUT ON AN UNFORTUNATELY NOT VERY DETAILED MAP--APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN NEAR THE LESSER ZAB RIVER WHERE IT FLOWS INTO IRAQ (APPROXIMATELY 36°1N 45°20E). HE HAD HAD A LARGE HOSPITAL THERE TO WHICH FRENCH DOCTORS CAME EVERY MONTH, AND OFTEN THE KDPI WAS PUT IN THE ANOMALOUS SITUATION OF HAVING BOTH TALABANI AND IRAQI ARMY CASUALTIES AT THE



HOSPITAL AT THE SAME TIME. THE LOCALS BECAME UNTENABLE BECAUSE THE IRANIAN ARMY WAS JUST TO THE EAST, THE IRAQI ARMY JUST TO THE WEST, AND TALABANI'S FORCES BEHIND THE IRAQI ARMY FURTHER TO THE WEST--"EVERYBODY WAS POUNDING EVERYBODY." NOW HE HAS MOVED TO A POINT (APPROXIMATELY 3620N 4515E) SOME THIRTY-FIVE KILOMETERS TO THE NORTH, AGAIN RIGHT ON THE IRANIAN BORDER SO THAT QASSEMLU SPENDS MUCH OF HIS TIME ON THE IRANIAN SIDE (HE CLAIMS), BUT WHERE THE IRAQI ARMY IS MUCH FURTHER AWAY TO THE WEST. THUS, HIS HEADQUARTERS NOW APPEARS TO BE IN A KIND OF NO-MAN'S-LAND WHERE THE KDPI HAS FULL SWAY. HE SAYS HE HAS REBUILT THE HOSPITAL THERE AND THE FRENCH DOCTORS CONTINUE TO COME.

12. ON FIGHTING AT MAWAT ON THE GOGASUR RIVER JUST TO THE SOUTH OF WHERE HIS FORMER HEADQUARTERS WAS, QASSEMLU SAID THAT THE IRANIAN OBJECTIVE IS TO CLEAR TALABANI'S EAST-WEST ACCESS. TALABANI'S HEADQUARTERS, HE CLAIMED, IS LOCATED SOUTHEAST OF MAWAT (SOMEWHERE VAGUELY IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHILER RIVER WHICH MEETS THE GOGASUR SOUTH OF MAWAT, APPROXIMATELY AT 3547N 4540E). THE IRANIANS CONTROL THE RIDGE OVERLOOKING MAWAT TO THE EAST, THE IRAQIS CONTROL THE HILLS SOUTHWEST OF MAWAT, AND THERE HAS BEEN MUCH FIGHTING THERE AND IN THE MOUNTAIN WEST OF MAWAT WHICH THE IRANIANS PARTIALLY CONTROL. JUST THAT MORNING QASSEMLU RECEIVED A CALL FROM HIS HEADQUARTERS THAT THE IRAQIS HAD JUST LAUNCHED A NEW ATTACK ON THE IRANIAN POSITIONS WEST OF MAWAT. MAWAT ITSELF, "LIKE PANJWIN," QASSEMLU COMMENTED, IS COMPLETELY ABANDONED.

RELATIONS WITH TALABANI

13. QASSEMLU CLAIMED TO BE "VERY GOOD FRIENDS" WITH TALABANI. RECENTLY HE HAD ASKED TALABANI TO PICK UP SOME CAVIAR FOR HIM FROM THE CASPIAN, AND WHEN TALABANI BROUGHT IT TO HIM HE JOKED THAT HE HAD HAD TO GO THROUGH SPECIAL CHANNELS TO GET MORE CAVIAR THAN IS NOW USUALLY PERMITTED AND IF THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES HAD KNOWN WHOM IT WAS FOR "THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN APOPLECTIC." QASSEMLU ADMITTED THAT THERE ARE TIMES WHEN DELICATE ISSUES ARISE. FOR EXAMPLE, RECENTLY 52 IRAQI SOLDIERS, INCLUDING SIX OFFICERS, HAD TAKEN REFUGE WITH THE KDPI AND TALABANI HAD DEMANDED THAT THEY BE HANDED OVER. THE DISPUTE WENT ON FOR TWO WEEKS BUT QASSEMLU WAS ADAMANT THAT THE KDPI MUST REMAIN "ABSOLUTELY NEUTRAL" IN ALL MATTERS BETWEEN IRAQIS AND KURDS, AND HE EVENTUALLY HANDED THE SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS BACK TO THE IRAQI ARMY. QASSEMLU, WHO WHILE BEING REMARKABLY OPEN ALSO TENDED TO CHOOSE HIS WORDS CAREFULLY, WAS UNWILLING TO BE DRAWN OUT ABOUT HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH MAS'UD BARZANI, BUT HE RIDICULED THE IDEA THAT THE BARZANIS' "KDP" WAS EVER "A REAL PARTY." "THEY ARE



MERELY A TRIBE."

SADDAM IS IN CHARGE

14. QASSEMLU WAS UNWILLING TO DISCUSS HIS MEETING WLTH SADDAM, INDEED EVEN DIRECTLY TO ADMIT IT TOOK PLACE (ALTHOUGH PRIVATELY TO THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR HE HAD BEEN MORE CANDID), ALTHOUGH HE DID ALLUDE TO THE PERSIAN SAYING THAT "IF YOU CAN MEET GOD, THERE IS NO POINT IN SETTling FOR ONE OF THE TWELVE IMAMS." QASSEMLU SAID THAT, UNLIKE MUJAHEDIN E-KHALQ LEADER RAJAVI, HE HAD "ABSOLUTELY NO DESIRE" TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED WITH SADDAM OR HAVE ANY PUBLICITY OF HIS TRAVEL TO BAGHDAD, MUCH LESS OF MEETING SADDAM--"IT DOES NOT GO OVER VERY WELL IN IRAN." POLCHIEF PRESSED HIM ON WHO IN IRAQ IS IN CHARGE OF KURDISH ISSUES, AND QASSEMLU SAID, "SADDAM. HE IS IN CHARGE OF EVERYTHING." THAT ASIDE, HOWEVER, HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN DAY-TO-DAY AFFAIRS, "THERE ARE THREE IMPORTANT PEOPLE IN IRAQ: SADDAM; 'ADNAN (KHAYRALLAH, MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND FIRST COUSIN AND BGOOTHER-IN-LAW OF SADDAM), WHO IS IN CHARGE OF THE SOUTH; AND 'ALI HASAN (AL-MAJID, PATER-NAL COUSIN AND LOOK-ALIKE OF SAWAAVØ| WHO IS IN UHAR3 RGFITHE NORTH." HOWEVER, QASSEMLU INDICATED HE DID NOT SEE 'ALI HASAN, HEADQUARTERED IN KIRKUK, VERY OFTEN, APPARENTLY BECAUSE QASSEMLU NEVER SETTLES FOR LESS THAN "GOD."

VILLAGE DESTRUCTION

15. POLCHIEF ASKED QASSEMLU FOR HIS REACTION TO THE IRAQI CAMPAIGN OF DESTROYING KURDISH VILLAGES. QASSEMLU ACKNOWLEDGED THAT "MOST" VILLAGES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED BUT HE SEEMED UNEMOTIONAL ON THE POINT. POLCHIEF ASKED IF THE CAMPAIGN HAD HAD THE EFFECT OF INCREASING THE NUMBER OF GUERRILLAS AND REFUGEES. HE ANSWERED THAT IT HAD "GREATLY" INCREASED THE NUMBER OF UERRILLAS BUT NEITHER HE NOR TALABANI ENCOURAGED THE IDEA OF REFUGEES INTO THE OTHER'S TERRITORY, BECAUSE OF THE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN FEEDING AND CARING FOR PEOPLE. THE NET EFFECT OF THE IRAQI VILLAGE DES-TRUCTION CAMPAIGN, HE ACKNOWLEDGED, IS THE ALMOST COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF THE IRAQI KURDS' TRADITIONAL AGRARIAN WAY OF LIFE. KURDISH MEN IN IRAQ HAVE ONLY TWO CHOICES, TO GO TO THE CITIES OR TO STAY: IN NEWLY CONSTRUCTED CENTERS WHERE THE ONLY LIVELIHOOD IS TO BE "JAHASH." QASSEMLU SAID THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE SO FAR ONLY DESTROYED 25 VILLAGES, OUT OF OVER SEVEN THOUSAND IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN (AND A CLAIMED KURDISH POPULATION IN IRAN OF SEVEN MILLION), BUT HE COMMENTED, "ALAS, EACH SIDE TENDS TO LEARN BAD HABITS FROM THE



OTHER." ONE BAD HABIT THAT HE CLAIMED THE IRANIANS HAVE (#) IS THE USE OF CHEMICUL WEAPONS. "BOTH SIDES DO IT, ALTHOUGH THE IRAQIS MUCH MORE." POLCHIEF ASKED WHETHER, GIVEN THE DENUDED NATURE OF MOST OF KURDISTAN, HELICOPTERS AND OTHER AIRBORNE ATTACKS POSE A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE PESHMERGA. QASSEMLU SAID, "NEITHER WE NOR THE IRAQI KURDS ARE WORRIED ABOUT HELICOPTERS. WE CAN TAKE CARE OF THEM. BUT ARTILLERY IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR US. AND CHEMICAL WARFARE IS A PROBLEM TOO."

A KURD'S VIEW OF IRAQ

16. QASSEMLU DID NOT GO OUT OF HIS WAY TO CRITICIZE IRAQ, BUT HE COULD NOT RESIST A BARRAGE OF CUTTING REMARKS THAT CLEARLY SHOWED HIS DISDAIN FOR ARABS AND FOR THE IRAQI REGIME. IN PARTICULAR, HE SAID THAT HE VERY MUCH DISLIKED BAGHDAD AND AVOIDED COMING UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. HE GRUDGINGLY ADMITTED THAT IRAN IS A MORE FLUID AND DYNAMIC SOCIETY--"YES, IN URMIA PEBPLE CAN PICKIUP THE PHONE TO THE UNITED STATES ANY TIME THEY WANT, AND THEY ARE FREE TO TRAVEL OUT OF THE COUNTRY," HE SAID WISTFULLY --BUT HE WAS QUICK TO EMPHASIZE THAT THERE IS MUCH LESS INTERFERENCE IN PEOPLE'S PRIVATE MORALS IN IRAQ AND THAT IRAQ STANDS FOR "MORE MODERN IDEAS." HE HAD DETESTED THE SHAH, "BUT KHOMEINI IS MUCH WORSE." HE HAD SEEN KHOMEINI TWICE IN 1979 AND BEEN "LIED TO SHAMELESSLY." QASSEMLU PROCEEDED TO GIVE A LECTURE ON THE SHI'A PRACTICE OF "TAQIYA" (DECEIT TO SERVE A HIGHER PURPOSE) AS AN PNGRAINED PART OF THE SHI'A PERSONALITY; POLCHIEF NOTED THAT WE HAD RECENTLY LEARNED A FEW LDSSONS ON THE SUBJECT OURSELVES.

RAJAVI

17. QASSEMLU ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE KDPI IS IN NEED OF ALLIANCES WITH OTHER IRANIAN OPVBSITION GROUPS, SINCE BY ITSELF IT OBVIOUSLY CANNOT OVERTHROW THE REGIME. HE ADMITTED THAT THE REGIME HAS WIDE SUVPORT ("HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF MULLAHS WHO ALL SEE THEIR LIVELIHOOD AT STAKE") AND ITS OVERTHROW WILL BE NO EASY MATTER. POL-CHIEF ASKED ABOUT A POSSIBLE ALLIANCE WITH RAJAVI WHO, IN ANY CASE, HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN MOUNTING MILITARY ACTIONS IN THE NORTH. QASSEMLU DESCRIBED RAJAVI AS AN "AMATEUR," WHO HAS 1200 FIGHTERS "AT THE MOST" BUT HAS A GOOD PROPAGANDA MACHINE. HE ADMITTED THAT RAJAVI "HAD TRIED A FEW ACTIONS IN THE NORTH," BUT UNLIKE THE KDPI THE MUJAHEDIN E-KHALQ "HAVE NO REAL STRENGTH IN PLACE IN IRAN." "IN FACT, OF ALL THE OPPOSITION GROUPS," QASSEMLU CLAIMED, "ONLY MY PARTY HAS SIGNIFICANT STRENGTH INSIDE IRAN." QASSEMLU SAID THATSRAJAVI'S RECENT



ACTIONS IN THE NORTH HAD CAUSED PROBLEMS FOR THE KDPI, BECAUSE IT HAD ON OCCASION ENGAGED TALABANI'S FORCES. QASSEMLU SAID THAT HENCEFORTH RAJAVI WILL NOT BE OPERATING IN THE NORTH BUT HAS NOW SWITCHED TO THE SOUTH. HE ADMITTED THAT RAJAVI "IS APPARENTLY NOT EAGER FOR ANY ALLIANCES." "RAJAVI HAS VISIONS OF GRANDEUR; HE THINKS HE IS ABLE TO CARRY IT BY HIMSELF."

KDPI CONGRESS

18. IN AN ASIDE, THE KDPI PARIS REPRESENTATIVE (WHO WITH HIS COLLEAGUE IN STOCKHOLM WAS TO RETURN TO EUROPE FEBRUARY 15) SAID THAT "APPROXIMATELY 200" PARTY REPRESENTATIVES HAD APPEARED FOR THE CONGRESS, HELD AT THE NEW PARTY HEADQUARTERS. THE CONGRESS HAD ALWAYS PREVIOUSLY BEEN BIENNIAL, BUT BECAUSE OF THE ENORMOUS DIFFICULTIES FACED BY MANY OF THE PARTY MEMBERS IN MAKING THE JOURNEY FROM OUTLYING PARTS OF IRANIAN KURDISTAN OVER THE BORDER TO THE HEADQUARTERS IN IRAQ, IT HAS NOW BEEN DECIDED NOT TO HAVE THE NEXT CONGRESS FOR THREE YEARS. QASSEMLU, WHILE REPEATEDLY STRESSING THE DEMOCRATIC NATURE OF HIS PARTY AND ITS POLICIES (AND HE CLARIFIED THAT HE MEANT "DEMOCRATIC" IN THE WESTERN RATHER THAN EASTERN SENSE), ADMITTED THAT HE HAD HAD NO OPPONENT FOR POSITION OF SECRETARY GENERAL. POLCHIEF ASKED WHETHER ANY KDPI REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE U.S. HAD PARTICIPATED, AND THE REPLY WAS THAT WHILE ONE HAD ATTENDED THE PREVIOUS CONGRESS, NONE CAME THIS TIME.

KOMALA

19. THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR DISPLAYED CONSTERNATION THAT TWO WEEKS AGO HE HAD GIVEN A PROMINENT IRANIAN KURDISH FIGURE, SHAYH 'IZZ AL-DIN HUSAYNI, A TOURIST VISA TO SWEDEN, AND NOW HE IS ASKING FOR ASYLUM. THE VISA HAD BEEN REQUESTED ON HIS BEHALF BY HIS SON-IN-LAW, NAMED CHAMSI, THE BAGHDADREPRESENTATIVE OF KOMALA (SMALL MARXIST IRANIAN KURDISH GROUP). QASSDMLU DISCOUNTED SHAYKH HUSAYNI'S RELIGIOUS IMPBRTANCE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF KOMALA.

BIOGRAPHICS

20. QASSEMLU (GHASSEMLOU) WAS BORN IN 1930. HIS EARLY EDUCATION WAS IN URMIA BUT HE ALSO ATTENDED THE AMERICAN COLLEGE IN TEHRAN. HE WENT TO UNIVERSITY IN PARIS BUT WAS EXPELLED FROM IRAN (#) REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES. HE WON A SCHOLARSHIP AT THE UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE, AND HE WAS



AN ECONOMICS PROFESSOR IN PRAGUE FOR TWENTY YEARS. HE DEPARTED WHEN THE SOVIETS MARCHED IN IN 1968. OFF AND ON DURING THE 1970S HE SERVED AS AN ECONOMIST IN THE MINISTRY OF PLANNING IN BAGHDAD, DURING WHICH HE AUTHORED A MAJOR OVERALL ECONOMIC PLAN FOR IRAQ, HE CLAIMS. OF MEDIUM HEIGHT AND SLENDER BUILD, HIS HAIR IS GRAYING BUT HE MOVES WITH THE QUICKNESS AND AGILITY OF A YOUNGER MAN. HE TELLS A GOOD ANECDOTE AND PEPPERS HIS CONVERSATION WITH CONSTANT HUMOR.

NEWTON

NOTE BY OC/T: (#): OMISSION: PARA 20 LINE 4. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

